COLOMBIA: LOS PACHENCA HOLDING ON in Northern Colombia After Leader’s Death (Jesús María Aguirre Gallego, aka: Chucho Mercancía)
The death of Chucho Mercancía in June 2019 marked the beginning of a very bad year for Los Pachenca
In May 2019, Colombian President Iván Duque vowed to end Los Pachenca, stating that this was a promise from the country’s security council. Just over a year on, that promise may soon be fulfilled.
Los Pachenca have been the target of repeated military and police assaults, which have led to many of its top leadership being killed or captured. The latest coup against the group came in mid-June when Deimer Patiño Giraldo, alias “80,” identified as the commander of Los Pachenca, was killed during an operation carried out by Colombia’s Comando Jungla Special Forces of the anti-drug police in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, according to reports from El Tiempo and El Heraldo.
Santa Marta Metropolitan Police Commander Oscar Solarte said that his forces killed Patiño Giraldo during a firefight between the Comando Jungla and the leader’s security team.
Patiño Giraldo had not been in the role for long. He took over the group — also known as the Conquering Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada (Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada — ACSN) — after the killing last year of former leader Jesús María Aguirre Gallego, alias “Chucho Mercancía,” and the capture of his second-in-command, Jhon Salazar Salcedo, alias “Flash,” during another police operation in the Sierra Nevada.
As a result, Patiño Giraldo found himself in charge of Los Pachenca’s 200 members. The group has a presence in key drug trafficking zones throughout the Caribbean, including along the route that connects Magdalena department with La Guajira to the north, as well as strategic rural corridors connecting Santa Marta’s Sierra Nevada to the Caribbean Sea.
One of Patiño Giraldo’s main duties was taking up arms against the Urabeños, the group’s former allies and now rivals, which have been concentrated in the city of Santa Marta since the end of 2019. Both groups are attempting to seize control of the international drug trafficking routes that leave from the city.
InSight Crime Analysis
The death of Patiño Giraldo comes at a terrible time for Los Pachenca. The group is a government target, has seen members increasingly killed or captured and has come under increasing pressure from the Urabeños.
The loss of Patiño Giraldo does not carry the same immediate impact as the killing of Aguirre Gallego, who had led the group for years. But it has also lost a raft of other members.
In October 2019, four months after Aguirre Gallego’s death, Leandro Jhonatan Lara, alias “Barbas,” Los Pachenca’s chief financial planner, was also captured. He was one of the group’s founders and believed to be the link with the Urabeños before the alliance foundered.
In December 2019, Elkin Javier López Torres, alias “La Silla,” a drug trafficker who was facing a US extradition request, turned himself in to authorities.
López Torres was a key actor for Los Pachenca, most importantly for trafficking drugs out of the Port of Santa Marta. His capture has greatly handicapped the group’s ability to ship drugs through the area, according to an analyst of conflict dynamics in Colombia’s Caribbean who spoke to InSight Crime on condition of anonymity.
But the government is not only looking to decapitate the criminal group. Other operations have targeted the flow of drugs leaving the port of Santa Marta, a critical point for the group to send drug shipments to Europe and Asia.
And all of this has occurred as Los Pachencas and the Urabeños have battled across Colombia’s Magdalena department.
These combined pressures have left Los Pachenca severely weakened and at risk of losing Santa Marta altogether, according to the analyst.
What’s more, the Urabeños also control the port of Barranquilla, the capital of Atlántico department, as well as the port of Cartagena, the capital city of Bolívar department and Colombia’s most important port. The Urabeños’ control of this stretch of the Caribbean puts them in an extremely advantageous position over drug trafficking routes.
And while Los Pachenca appear to still control their long-term stronghold in La Sierra Nevada, the loss of other key areas has left them severely weakened.
BACKGROUND: Los Pachenca Leader Killed, Casting Doubt on Colombia Group’s Future
The killing of the principal leader of Colombia’s “Los Pachenca” criminal group, as well as high-level arrests within the group, is generating doubts about the organization’s future.
Jesús María Aguirre Gallego, alias “Chucho Mercancía,” was shot and killed by Colombian forces on June 17, near Santa Marta, according to an official news release.
The United States had issued an arrest warrant for Mercancía for drug trafficking. He had also been accused of murder, extortion, and forced displacements in Santa Marta, on Colombia’s Caribbean coast.
During the operation against Mercancía, authorities also shot and killed Mario Giraldo, his bodyguard. Giraldo is the cousin of notorious paramilitary leader Hernán Girlado.
Mercancía’s killing was not the only blow to the group this year. On May 19, Colombian authorities captured John Rafael Salazar, alias “Flash,” the second in command within Los Pachenca.
Flash was detained in Riohacha, in the department of Guajira. He was accused of murder, drug trafficking and extortion.
For at least six years, Los Pachenca have carried out criminal activities on Colombia’s Caribbean Coast, but only recently has the group come onto authorities’ radar.
The organization’s zone of influence extends across northern Colombia, to cities like Riohacha and Barranquilla, where in November of 2018 authorities seized a ton of cocaine belonging to the group. Colombia’s Ombudsman’s office issued a warning about the organization’s presence in the Atlantic and La Guajira regions.
The group’s extensive support network gives it access to extortion and microtrafficking in the region’s capitals, and keeps its leaders informed about the presence of authorities.
According to intelligence reports, Mercancía had some 150 men under his command running extortion rackets and watching over drug trafficking routs in the Sierra Nevada area.
Recent arrests by authorities have also revealed that Los Pachenca were part of a powerful criminal alliance that sought to traffic cocaine through the Caribbean. Included in those arrests was Alba Nery Rodríguez, alias “La Gaviota,” Mercancía’s girlfriend.
InSight Crime Analysis
Mercancía’s killing could be a hard blow to Los Pachenca. But the organization has weathered massive drug seizures and numerous captures in the past, thanks to its ability to renew its criminal networks.
Los Pachenca’s success stems from its ties to Colombia’s paramilitary groups, which schooled the group’s leaders who then filled the criminal vacuum when the paramilitaries demobilized.
Mercancía started in the ranks of Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias “Jorge 40,” the paramilitary chief of the Northern Block of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC).
Following the group’s demobilization, Mercancía worked with Miguel Angel Mejia Munera and his brother Victor Manuel, together known as “los mellizos,” or the twins, in a violent drug trafficking group known as “Los Nevados.” When one of the twins died, Mercancía went on to monitor shipments for “Los Urabeños” until he was captured in 2012.
During a visit to La Guajira, InSight Crime learned how much influence Los Pachenca have in this region, a key drug transit route. Members of the group supervise the departure of boats and run microtrafficking in the urban areas.
The group is active along the coast near the towns of Dibulla and Riohacha, the final point in a drug route that starts in the Sierra Nevada mountains near Santa Marta. The route ends on the beaches of La Guajira, where speedboats depart loaded with cocaine.
After Mercancía’s death, it is uncertain who will take charge of the organization, or even whether it can weather the loss.
Not long ago, authorities identified an internal dispute within Los Pachenca. On one side was Mercancía and Deimer Patiño Giraldo, alias “80. On the opposite side was John Rafael Salazar, alias “Flash,” the group’s recently captured second-in-command. With both Mercancía and Flash out of the way, it is likely that Patiño Giraldo already has control of Flash’s structure. However, it is not clear if he is capable of leading the organization.
Another scenario is that Los Pachenca weaken in the wake of Mercancía’s killing. That would leave key drug routes up for grabs in Santa Marta’s Sierra Nevada. Other criminal actors in the area include the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) guerrillas and possibly the powerful drug trafficking group Los Urabeños. A fight with any of these groups for control of routes and coca crops could erupt.
The Urabeños emerged from the ashes of Colombia’s paramilitary movement to become the dominant criminal force in Colombia, with a reach that spread across the country. However, under pressure from authorities, the hold that leadership has over local cells that form this national network is getting weaker, and the group stands on the precipice of splintering into independent factions.
The Urabeños take their name from Urabá, a northwestern region of Colombia near the Panamanian border highly prized by drug traffickers as it offers access to the Caribbean and Pacific coasts from the departments of Antioquia and Chocó. The group also refers to itself as the Gaintanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) and are called the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) by the Colombian government.
The Urabeños’ origins can be traced to notorious paramilitary warlord Vicente Castaño, who in 2006 broke away from the demobilization process of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), and rearmed a paramilitary unit with two of his lieutenants: the former commander of the AUC’s Calima Bloc, Ever Veloza Garcia, alias “HH,” and Daniel Rendón Herrera, alias “Don Mario,” the former finance chief of one of the wealthiest paramilitary factions, the Centauros Bloc.
When Castaño was killed in March 2007, most likely after having been betrayed by HH, Don Mario inherited the network, and set to work recruiting former paramilitary fighters in Urabá, where his brother, Fredy, alias “El Aleman,” had commanded the AUC’s 2,000-strong Elmer Cardenas Bloc.
Don Mario quickly assembled a fighting force of around 80 men and then monopolized this important drug route, taxing traffickers for every kilogram of cocaine that passed through his territory. By 2008, Don Mario was one of the richest and most-wanted traffickers in Colombia. He began to expand his empire, moving into southern Córdoba province, the Bajo Cauca region in northern Antioquia, and into Medellín, and the Urabeños soon clashed with rivals such as the Paisas, the Rastrojos and the Oficina de Envigado. Police blamed Don Mario’s organization for at least 3,000 homicides between 2007 and 2009.
Don Mario was captured on a farm in rural Urabá in April 2009 by a team of 200 police commandos. Following his capture, the Urabeños fell under the control of Juan de Dios Úsuga, alias “Giovanni,” and Dario Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” two brothers who had begun their underworld careers with the now demobilized guerrillas of the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) before passing into the ranks of the AUC.
The Úsuga brothers gathered other former EPL guerrillas turned paramilitaries, who formed the disciplined and capable military core of the Urabeños, the “Estado Mayor,” or board of directors. They launched a new expansion plan by sending trusted lieutenants from Urabá to take control of strategic drug trafficking real estate, preferably through alliances and agreements, but otherwise through violence.
In January 2012, Giovanni, the mastermind of the Urabeños strategy, was killed during a police raid on a ranch in the department of Chocó, leaving Otoniel as the maximum leader. Despite this setback, the Urabeños expansion continued, and when the leader of their principal rivals, the Rastrojos, surrounded to the authorities in mid-2012, the path was clear for the group to become Colombia’s dominant criminal organization.
The Urabeños’ influence spread across the country, and soon the group controlled drug production zones, trafficking corridors and international dispatch points throughout north Colombia, along both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts and along the land border with Venezuela.
To facilitate this expansion, the Urabeños also developed a new model of organized crime. While some of its cells were directly controlled, in other cases the group absorbed local criminal organizations into its network, which operated as semi-autonomous members of the Urabeños “franchise.”
In 2015, the government launched a major offensive against the Urabeños known as “Operation Agamemnon.” While the initial phase of the operation saw seizures of multi-ton shipments of cocaine and millions of dollars in assets, and the arrests of hundreds of Urabeños members — its principal targets — the Urabeños leadership, remained elusive.
However, this began to change in phase two of Agamemnon, and in 2017 the Urabeños command nodes began to fall. In May, security forces captured Eduardo Ortiz Tuberquia, alias “El Indio.” In August, they killed Otoniel’s second-in-command, Roberto Vargas Gutiérrez, alias “Gavilán,” and then in November, they killed military boss Luis Orlando Padierma, alias “Inglaterra.”
With the pressure mounting, and following two years of tentative approaches, in September 2017 Otoniel offered to turn himself in and demobilize the Urabeños, even appearing in a public video appealing to the Colombian government.
The Urabeños are primarily dedicated to transnational drug trafficking. Members of the leadership group are themselves international traffickers that manage their own routes. However, the network as a whole is less a drug cartel and more a service provider to independent drug traffickers. The group controls territories and regulates or runs the coca base market, escorting shipments along international trafficking corridors, ensuring access to or protection for processing laboratories, and providing storage and dispatch services in coastal and border regions.
The Urabeños network model requires local cells to be financially self-sufficient. As a result, these groups have expanded into illegal mining, extortion and microtrafficking, and they run or take a cut of other criminal activities that take place in their territories.
Leadership and Structure
The Urabeños established a mixed network model, in which approximately one-third of local cells were directly commanded by the leadership in Urabá, while the others were local criminal organizations that used the Urabeños name and were expected to provide services or follow strategic orders when called upon. The network is coordinated by a national command node based in their stronghold of Urabá, consisting of former EPL guerrillas-turned-paramilitaries that is led by Otoniel. However, this command node has been devastated by recent security forces operations, leaving Otoniel an increasingly isolated figure largely concentrated on his own survival.
The Urabeños franchise has presence in at least 17 of Colombia’s departments, as well as internationally. The group’s base and territorial stronghold is centered around the Gulf of Urabá in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, and stretching into Córdoba. They have an extensive presence throughout the rest of these departments, as well as along the Caribbean coast, in the city of Medellín and in departments such as La Guajira, Santander, Valle del Cauca and Norte de Santander.
Allies and Enemies
The competition for territory sparked by the demobilization of the guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) has pitted the Urabeños against the smaller guerrilla group the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN). In the department of Chocó in particular, the rivals are involved in a bitter and bloody turf war.
The new mafia forming from FARC remnants, meanwhile, has the potential to create both new allies and enemies, depending on whether the two sides perceive it to be in their interests to cooperate or compete for the territory left behind by the guerrillas. In some areas, notably Córdoba in the north, the Urabeños are reportedly working with ex-FARC mafia, while in others, such as parts of Antioquia they are violently clashing with them.
Furthermore, in early 2018, there were signs of local criminal groups previously part of the Urabeños violently rebelling against the central command, raising the possibility of new enemies emerging from within the network. This may be linked to rumors that the Urabeños high command has been unable to pay some of its members due to security force operations and cash flow problems.
The Urabeños’ drug trafficking operations has also seen the group build alliances with independent drug traffickers within Colombia and Mexican drug trafficking groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and Zetas.
The leadership node that has coordinated the network from Urabá is almost certainly entering its final days. Gavilán, Inglaterra and others are dead, El Indio and more have been captured, other leaders are surrendering individually while Otoniel is trying to broker his own surrender. Sources indicate that Otoniel’s hold over the organization is tenuous, and that individual factions obey his orders only when they feel it is in their own interests. The breakup of the Urabeños model of a central leadership node coordinating dispersed factions and semi-independent local franchises now seems inevitable.
However, no matter what happens to the Urabeños leadership, the Urabeños cells on the ground will not disappear. They will continue to control key strategic criminal territories, offering services to drug traffickers and other criminal elites, and running their own localized criminal activities. Some may operate as the private armies of the Urabeños drug traffickers that currently head certain fronts, whereas others may become independent networks with leaders from within the local ranks. The nucleus of the network may shift away from Urabá, but the network will continue operating.
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